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THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRINCIPLES OF CHARLES 
HAMILTON HOUSTON: LESSONS IN INNOVATION 
Professor Jose Felipe Andersont 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the legal giants in American history is Charles Hamilton 
Houston. To modern lawyers he is still obscure, but some 
recognition of his extraordinary legal talent came during the 
nation's celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 1 
Although Houston died over four years before the Supreme 
Court issued its historic opinion in Brown,2 he was widely 
recognized as the architect of that decision, which banned 
segregation in public school education. 3 Prior to his death, 
Houston had worked on litigation to eradicate segregation in 
education since the early 1930's.4 Houston's first major victory in 
this effort was in Pearson v. Murray,5 when he, along with 
Thurgood Marshall and William I. Gosnell, successfully 
challenged the racial exclusion policy at the University of 
Maryland School of Law.6 The Pearson case was also the first 
major victory in the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People's (NAACP) legal assault on "Jim CroW."7 
t Professor of Law and Director, Stephen L. Snyder Center for Litigation Skills, 
University of Baltimore School of Law. Adjunct Professor of Legal Studies and 
Business Ethics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. B.A., 
University of Maryland Baltimore County; J.D., University of Maryland School 
of Law. I would like to thank Charles Hamilton Houston, Jr., and Charles 
Hamilton Houston III for their support and encouragement in this ongoing 
research effort. I gratefully acknowledge the staff of the University of Baltimore 
Law Review who took such care with this article and my administrative assistant 
Gloria Joy for her technical support. I would also like to thank the University uf 
Baltimore Educational Foundation for its financial support of this project. 
I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. Charles Houston died on April 22, 1950. GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: 
CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 211 (Univ. 
of Penn. Press 1983). 
3. 347 U.S. 483, 495 ("We conclude that in the field of public education the 
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."). 
4. See McNEIL at 132-33. 
5. 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936). 
6. McNEIL, supra note 2, at 138-39. For an outstanding summary of that effort, see 
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 186-94 (Alfred A. Knopf 1987) (1975). 
7. The phrase "Jim Crow," which originated from a popular minstrel show act and 
song, became associated with the many laws throughout America designed to 
separate the races. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM 
CROW 7 n.1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1966). The practical effect was to render 
African Americans second class citizens. See id. 
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The legal significance of Houston's civil rights work, however, 
has obscured his impact on other areas of the law. 8 This is 
particularly true with regard to his impact on the criminal justice 
system. During his remarkable career that spanned only about a 
quarter century, Houston engaged in litigation that still affects 
some of the most important areas of criminal justice in the nation. 
This article is an effort to identify a few of those major areas and 
recognize Houston's rightful place among the criminal justice 
legends of the twentieth century. 
His impact on the law of jury selection, capital punishment, 
right to counsel, police interrogation and mental state defenses 
have set the standard for the most important criminal justice 
jurisprudence in the nation's courts. Although he was not the first 
lawyer to address these important issues, he certainly had as great 
an impact on their development as he did on the civil rights work 
which has been the most visible part of his legacy.9 
In his brief career his criminal law case choices reflected his 
profound concern for the criminally accused. Further, his selection 
of controversial issues, difficult cases and visionary strategies 
foreshadowed both the modem criminal justice landscape and laid 
out the battle ground for current criminal justice disputes. 
Houston's work defies easy categorization. While he was 
obviously concerned with equal protection under the law involving 
issues of race he also embraced structures which provided more 
general fairness in criminal law. 
From examining Houston's criminal law work in all criminal 
cases that either resulted in or were appeals from reported cases, I 
have concluded that there are several important characteristics that 
suggest when Houston would invest his time and talent in a 
criminal case. It was not simply a question of fame or assignment 
and certainly not money. 10 
8. For example, Houston set precedents in two important labor law cases in the 
Supreme Court: Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) 
and Tunstall v. Bhd. a/Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). 
9. Charles Houston's career had several phases. He began working with his father's 
law firm after he graduated from Harvard with a Doctor of Judicial Science 
degree, the first awarded to an African American. See McNEIL, supra note 2, at 
53, 56. He later began a career teaching law which resulted in his being 
appointed Vice-Dean of Howard University Law School, where he secured 
accreditation for the school from 1929 to 1934. See id. at 70, 74-75. In 1934, he 
left the Dean's post at Howard to become the first Special Counsel to the 
NAACP, where he served until 1940 when he returned to the private practice of 
law in his father's Washington, D.C. firm until his death. See id. at 90, 155-56. 
In all phases of his career he was involved in criminal justice issues where his 
participation included policy study, protest and courtroom advocacy. 
10. The financial records of the Houston & Houston law firm reflect that from 1940-
1950 only about 9.5% of the firm's cases were criminal in nature. McNEIL, 
supra note 2, at 231. 
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Rather, Houston selected extremely difficulty criminal cases to 
test the system and advance important principles of fairness and 
justice that he determined to be worthwhile. In the same manner 
that he approached his systematic Jim Crow strategy, he also 
attacked the criminal justice system with vigor and passion. II 
The principles that motivated Houston's choice of criminal 
justice issues and cases are when one or more of the following 
circumstances existed: 
(I) Penalty was severe without 
adequate process; 
(2) Panel of the jury included no 
African-Americans; 
(3) Proof of the criminal case 
without sufficient integrity of the 
fact finding process; 
(4) Police procedures executed 
without adequate accountability in 
obtaining confessions; and when the 
(5) Purpose of the prosecution lacked 
adequate structural limitations. 12 
II. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN CONTEXT FROM 
1900-1930 
The criminal justice system that was in place in America during 
Houston's early years was very different than the one that most 
people are familiar with today. Although many provisions of the 
Bill of Rights related to criminal prosecution,13 few of those rights 
had real substantive meaning for a criminal defendant of any race 
during this time. Most criminal prosecutions were handled by 
local authorities in a variety of judicial systems. 14 Judges had 
broad discretion to impose punishment and appeals were 
expensive. ls Although a defendant had the right to counsel, that 
still meant that they needed to have the money to hire their own 
attorney.16 It was not until the Supreme Court examined the right 
to counsel in the 1930s that it was held that the Federal 
11. McNEIL, supra note 2, at 213-14. 
12. I call these principles the five uP's" of Houston's case commitment strategy: 
penalty, proof, panel, procedure and purpose. 
13. See U.S. CONST. amends. V-VIII. 
14. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 261, 
262,276 (BasicBooks 1993). 
15. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 241,255-56. 
16. Houston practiced law in an era that pre-dated the assurances of counsel to any 
criminal defendant if they could not afford to hire an attorney. Gideon v. 
Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). 
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Constitution required the state to provide a lawyer in a death 
penalty case. 17 
During the early years of the twentieth century, the court 
struggled over which provisions of the Bill of Rights it believed 
were "fundamental" for due process of law to be achieved. 18 There 
was great uncertainty about how much protection a state believed it 
was obligated to provide an accused. As one historian cogently 
observed: 
The Fourteenth Amendment said nothing explicit 
about criminal justice or the Bill of Rights. But it 
did speak of rights to due process and equal 
protection . . .. It imposed the "due process" 
obligation on the states. States, then, had a 
constitutional duty to run fair trials. But by whose 
standards?19 
Those standards were both imposed and enforced by state law 
and administered under the broad discretion of state officials. 
Many of the constitutional rights we take for granted today in 
state court proceedings were not so certain during this period in 
American legal history. For example, the privilege against self 
incrimination was not as comprehensive as it is today. In Twining 
v. New Jerse/o the Supreme Court of the United States allowed 
the judge to point out to the jury that two bank directors who were 
on trial for fraud did not take the stand in their own defense. 21 
Prior to 1914, the government could use evidence illegally seized 
in federal trials until the Supreme Court forbid the practice in 
Weeks v. United States. 22 States were free to continue to use 
illegally seized evidence until well into the middle of the twentieth 
century?3 
The Federal Government also took a greater interest in 
expanding prosecutorial power in the twentieth century. In 1913, 
Congress passed the federal income tax law, making it a crime to 
file "false or fraudulent returns. ,,24 Congress passed the Dlser Act, 
popularly known as the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,S which 
made it a crime to drive a stolen car across state lines.26 The 
17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72-73 (1932). 
18. See. e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
19. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 298. 
20. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
21. Id at 90,114. 
22. 232 U.S. 383,398 (1914). 
23. Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949). 
24. Underwood Tariff Act, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 3166, 38 Stat. 114, 177 (1913). 
25. Dyer Act of 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-70,41 Stat. 324 (1919). 
26. Id. at § 3, 41 Stat. at 325. 
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Supreme Court upheld the law under the "interstate commerce 
clause" of the United States Constitution.27 
Ill. PENALTY SEVERE WITHOUT PROCESS 
There was also dreadful unfairness in how the criminal law was 
applied to blacks at this time. One lawyer addressing the 
Mississippi Bar Association in 1910 noted that it was next to 
impossible "to convict even upon the strongest evidence any white 
man of a crime of violence upon the person of a negro. . .. 1 have 
even heard attorneys make the appeal to a jury that no white man 
should be punished for killing a negro.,,28 
In 1919 the NAACP published a report on lynching, covering a 
thirty year period when the practice was most rampant.29 Between 
1889 and 1918 a grand total of 3,224 persons were lynched, of 
which only 61 were women: 50 were black and 11 were white.3o 
Lynchings were disproportionately used for blacks who were 
alleged to have committed rape: 
A recent study of Georgia and North 
Carolina in the years 1882 to 1930 compared blacks 
who were lynched with those executed for crime. 
In Georgia, murder accounted for 88 percent of the 
executions of blacks, and rape only 12 percent; in 
North Carolina, the figures were 71 percent for 
murder, 22 percent for rape. The picture was quite 
different for "execution" by a lynch mob. Rape 
accounted for 41 percent of the lynch victims in 
Georgia-more than murder, which accounted for 
only 34 percent. In North Carolina, equal numbers 
were lynched for murder and rape (39 percent). The 
lynch mob, in short, showed an inordinate interest 
in stiffening the penalty for rape or suspected 
rape.31 
Charles Houston was no doubt influenced in his interest in 
criminal law by his father, William Lepre Houston, who was 
considered one of Washington, D.C. 's finest African-American 
attorneys. The elder Houston was a former high school principal 
27. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1925). 
28. Gerard C. Brandon, The Unequal Application a/the Criminal Law, 1 1. AM. INST. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 893,896 (1911). 
29. NAT'L ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, THIRTY YEARS OF 
LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1918 (1919). 
30. Jd at 7-8. 
31. FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 191 (citing E.M. Beck, James L. Massey & Stewart 
E. Tolnay, The Gallows, The Mob, and The Vote: Lethal Sanctioning of Blacks in 
North Carolina and Georgia, 1882 to 1930, 23 LAW AND SOC'y REV. 317, 329 
(1989». 
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from Kentucky who relocated to Washington, D.C. to take a 
federal job and attend law school at Howard University at night. 32 
Initially, Houston's father maintained a general law practice 
limited only to civil cases.33 Among the criminal cases he did 
accept was an appeal he handled during the year his son was 
completing his legal studies at Harvard. The case involved a 
defendant named William Laney who was convicted of 
manslaughter at tria1.34 As the appellate court put it, Laney was 
charged "with the crime of murder in the first degree, growing out 
of the killing of one Kenneth Crall, during a race riot in 
Washington on July 21, 1919.,,35 While on his way to the theater 
with his date, Mattie Burke, he was confronted by a lar~e mob that 
was yelling "catch the nigger" and "kill the nigger.,,3 The men 
chased Laney from the 600 block of Massachusetts Avenue. 37 
Laney stated that he pulled out his gun and the crowd stopped 
chasing him and while he was trying to fix the safety, his gun went 
off. 38 Later, as the mob pursued him they fired shots at Laney and 
he returned fire. 39 A member of the mob died from wounds 
suffered to his head during the shoot out.40 William Houston did 
not succeed on his appeal,41 despite the obvious racial overtones of 
the case. Laney reported that as many as 100 or more men were 
chasing him during the race riot. 42 
The race riots of 1919 caused grave concerns for all African-
Americans across the nation.43 William Houston's involvement in 
the important Laney case in the nation's capital would have no 
doubt left a lasting impression on his son who was, at the time, 
finishing his legal studies at Harvard.44 
32. McNEIL, supra note 2, at 21. 
33. Jd. at 26-27. 
34. Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
35. Jd. at413. 
36. Jd. 
37. Jd. 
38. Jd. 
39. Jd. 
40. Jd. at 416. 
41. Jd. 
42. !d. at 414. 
43. See HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LrFE 25 (Crown Publishers 1988). 
44. The poignancy of the occasion is unmistakable for a young Charles Houston: 
In 1919, the year of the 'Red Summer' more that 100 African 
Americans were murdered (eighty were lynched) and somc onc 
thousand were wounded in twenty-five race riots. Even the nation's 
capital was the scene of a terrible race riot, one observed first hand by 
... Charles Houston. 
Jd. 
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IV. PROOF OF THE CRIMINAL CASE WITHOUT 
SIGNIFICANT INTEGRITY OF THE FACT FINDING 
PROCESS 
A. Prosecution of Rape 
319 
The crimes of rape and attempted rape have always been areas 
of grave concern for African-Americans. The history of racial 
disparity in the criminal justice system has always been 
conspicuous when the crime at issue is rape, particularly when it 
involves a black man and a white woman.45 The famous 
"Scottsboro Boys" case is the most historically significant 
example.46 The allegation in that case of gang rape of two white 
women on a train sparked a national firestorm and subjected the 
accused in that case to potential execution.47 
Scottsboro was but one of many examples of how the mere 
allegation of interracial rape effects the administration of justice in 
the African-American community.48 Often, defendants accused of 
rape were znched before they could ever stand trial on the rape 
allegations. 9 If the defendant did stand trial, the odds of his 
winnin§ were very remote and success on any appeal was even less 
likely.s 
45. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 88 (Pantheon Books 1997). It 
has been noted by one jurist that "any honest chronicler of American legal history 
must acknowledge that the legal system in its treatment of blacks has been 
characterized by inequality .... " LOIS G. FORER, CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS: A 
TRIAL JUDGE REFLECTS ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 226 (W.W. Norton & Co. 
1980). 
46. The series of trials that came to be known as the "Scottsboro Boys" cases focused 
the country's attention on discrimination in the criminal justice system, primarily 
in the South. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49-53 (1932). The incident 
involved charges of rape against black youths accused by a white woman under 
prejudicial circumstances. See id. at 49. At the center of the controversy was the 
racial discrimination in jury selection in the case. See id. at 50. Under 
questioning at a hearing, prior to jury selection at a retrial of one of the 
defendants, a Morgan County, Alabama jury commissioner said "he had never 
met a Negro fit for jury duty." JAMES E. GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 123 
(Vintage Books 1994). 
47. See GOODMAN, supra note 46, at xi. 
48. See. e.g, Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888, 890 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding rape 
convictions were not improperly imposed against Negroes and that the imposition 
of the death penalty on conviction of rape where a life was taken was not a denial 
of due process). 
49. See, e.g, United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386,403-05 (1909) (stating that the 
negro defendant in the case awaiting a review of his rape conviction by the U.S. 
Supreme Court was lynched before it reached the Court). 
50. In the fictional book, To Kill a Mockingbird, lawyer Atticus Finch loses his 
defense of Tom Robinson, a black man accused of raping a white woman, despite 
the presentation of an overwhelming amount of persuasive exculpatory evidence. 
HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 198-221 (Harper & Row 1960). In 
answering his son's question as to how the illogical verdict could be given, Finch 
summarizes the race-influenced nature of justice this way: "I don't know, but 
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It is these historical circumstances that make Houston's 
contribution to rape jurisprudence so remarkable. In 1943, 
Houston successfully overturned the conviction of Samuel Legions 
in the Supreme Court of Virginia. 51 
Legions, an African-American, was indicted on December 8, 
1941 in Loudoun County, Virginia, accused of the rape of Viola 
Miller, a white woman.52 He was tried and found guilty by a 
jury.53 His conviction was based largely on the testimony of Mrs. 
Miller and her husband who lived in a section of Leesburg "almost 
exclusively inhabited by negroes.,,54 The two room house of the 
alleged victim faced the street55 and was located "directly across 
the street from a negro restaurant . . . . [NJear enough for loud 
talking in the house to be heard in the restaurant.,,56 
The complainant and her husband alleged that at about eight 
o'clock on the evening in question they went to bed and were 
awakened at about ten o'clock "by the falling of a wind shade," 
which they took to mean the presence of an intruder.57 As it 
happened, both of them knew Legions when they all had lived in 
Berryville, Virginia.58 
According to the couple, they were sleeping together with their 
month old child between them.59 The couple said the accused 
threatened to kill them although they "saw no weapon of any kind 
in his hands, nor did he say or pretend that he had any.,,60 In a 
they did it. They've done it before and they did it tonight and they'll do it again . 
. .. " Id. at 225. 
This sentiment of justice for minorities, both now and in previous generations, 
is cchoed by two commentators: "In thc annals of the administration of Justice 
are many cases of improper treatment of Ncgroes, Puerto Ricans, Spanish 
Americans and other minority groups. There is widespread belief that blacks 
particularly, are frequently subject to illegal arrest, arrest on weak suspicion, 
illegal detention and corporal handling by the police." Marvin E. Wolfgang & 
Bernard Cohen, Crime and Race, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 284, 287 (Thomas F. Pettigrew ed., Harper & Row 1975). The belief 
highlighted by Wolfgang and Cohen is not recognized by the courts. See 
Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 139, 148 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that 
evidence in the form of statistical analysis of disparity in imposition of the death 
penalty on African-American and white defendants did not establish racial 
discrimination and warrant reversal of conviction). 
51. Legions v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E.2d 764 (Va. 1943). 
52. ld. at 764. 
53. Id. 
54. Jd. 
55. Jd. ("The room they occupied as a bedroom on the ground floor had a door and a 
window looking directly toward the street and opening almost upon it, the bottom 
of the window being so close to the ground that one could step out of it if the sash 
were up."). 
56. ld. 
57. Jd. at 764-65. 
58. ld. at 765. 
59. ld. 
60. Jd. 
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struggle the "husband struck the accused with the window-shade 
and then pushed him into the window, breaking out the sash.,,61 
The defendant allegedly grabbed the victim and attempted to rape 
her in the bedroom but eventually "pulled her into the kitchen and 
accomplished his purpose across the table .... ,,62 
Houston and his co-counsel, a former student named Oliver W. 
Hill,63 argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Legions' 
conviction for rape and the appellate court agreed. The court 
concluded that the testimony of the Millers "in the light of the 
physical surroundings, and the absence of incidents which 
naturally ensue, is so contrary to human experience and so 
inherently incredible as to be totally insufficient to justify the 
verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.,,64 
The court appeared to challenge the trial jury's verdict for their 
accepting the story of Mr. Miller. It reasoned: 
Miller is forty eight years old - almost in the 
prime of life. He was regularly engaged in manual 
labor. He was working on the town dump-truck. 
When he was asked if he was passing himself off as 
a weakling, he said he was not. In the presence of a 
tragedy that could mean nothing but disgrace and 
humiliation to [his] wife ... , to himself, and to his 
children he was as servile as a slave. A few steps 
would have taken him out of the house and on to the 
street where he could have given an alarm which 
would have saved his wife.65 
As the court concluded its review of the trial evidence it again 
stressed its disbelief: "The whole thing does such shocking 
61. ld. 
62. ld. 
63. Oliver Hill recalled that Houston: 
was harder on himself than he was on us. But he had to be. He was 
preparing us for war. He had a soldier's faith that every hattie must 
be fought until it is won and without pause to take account of those 
stricken in the fray--even if it meant himself. 
RICHARD WORMSER, THE RISE AND FALL OF JIM CROW 151 CSt. Martin's Press 
2003). Hill, who was: 
a 1933 Howard University Law graduate was fast making a name for 
himself in Richmond where he practiced law. Hill and Thurgood 
Marshall had been classmates . . . and both had graduated with 
honors. . .. By 1940, Hill had become the NAACP's contact in 
Virginia and part of Houston's new breed of civil rights attorneys in 
the South. 
J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF TIIE BLACK LAWYER 1844-
1944 at 235 (Univ. of Penn. Press 1993). 
64. ld. at 764. 
65. ld. at 765. 
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violence to any righteous conception of human conduct as to be 
unbelievable even to the most credulous and naive.,,66 Although 
the court acknowledged that it was "mindful" of the jury's verdict 
that it was not required to believe the evidence that they relied on 
in this case.67 The court explained "we are not required to believe 
that which we know from human experience is inherently 
incredible. 'What we know as men we are not required to forget as 
judges. ",68 What is remarkable about Legions is that Houston and 
Hill had persuaded a southern court to disbelieve a jury's verdict in 
a case where a white man and his white wife testified as 
eyewitnesses against their black client. The result of the case 
defies all conventional history, tradition and folklore of its time. 69 
Perhaps it can partially be explained because of the court might 
have been less sympathetic to whites living among blacks. Often 
whites who associated with blacks were not treated well?O 
Still, it cannot be overlooked that Houston was able to secure 
victory for his client by convincing the highest court in Virginia to 
overturn a local jury and, in effect, call two white people liars and 
scold the trial jury for believing them.71 Part of Houston's genius 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 92. 
69. See supra note 51. Harvard Law Professor Randall Kennedy has noted that 
lynchings put pressure on court proceedings in the South. See KENNEDY, supra 
note 46, at 88-90. Professor Kennedy describes one court proceeding that took 
place in Desoto County, Mississippi in 1934: 
The courthouse where the trial took place was surronnded by 
barbed wire, machine guns, and more than three hundred National 
Guards equipped with gas masks and fixed bayonets. At one point 
during the joint trial of all three men, a mob of several thousand 
whites attempted to overcome the court's defenses. Against the 
backdrop of this intimidation, the jury deliberated only six minutes 
before returning the foreordained guilty verdict. The judge 
immediately condemned the men to execution by hanging .... 
Id. at 89. Prof. Kennedy has also noted that "[tJhe folklore that black men have a 
dangerous, virtually ungovernable lust for white women was thus elevated into 
proper evidence cognizable in a court oflaw." Id. at 90. 
70. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 188; see also ARTHUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY 
OF LYNCHING 476 app. 6 (Robert M. Fogelson & Richard E. Rubenstein eds., 
Amo Press 1969) (1933) (citing a threatened, but prevented, lynching of three 
whites who defended a black man accused of murder in Snow Hill, Maryland in 
1931). 
71. Such results were highly unusual at this time in history. The usual result was 
characterized in a letter by one lawyer writing in the summer of 1940: 
When the cases involved no such issues (on the race question) 
but are merely cases, I have noted that cases between Negro and 
Negro are handled somewhat differently than cases between white 
and white. I mean a spirit of levity, an expectation of something 
'comical' appears to exist. The seriousness in the white vs. Negro 
case is decidedly lacking. As you know it is a rare case indeed in 
which a Negro who has murdered a Negro receives the extreme 
penalty, either death or life imprisonment here, regardless of the 
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was his skill for persuasion and charm even among Southern 
whites in the legal system. One scholar has observed of Houston's 
work in a particular criminal case: 
Instead of emphasizing his client's respectability, 
Houston promoted his own, turning the trial into a 
demonstration of the progress of the black bar 
toward the standards of the highest reaches of the 
profession. . . . He so impressed local authorities 
with his professionalism that both the trial judge 
and prosecutor complimented him in open court. 
The strategy apparently swayed the judge and jury. 
Although his client was convicted, Crawford 
received life in prison instead of the expected death 
sentence. The end of the trial produced so many 
public statements of mutual respect from the 
defense, prosecution, and judge that one newspaper 
headlined its report: Crawford Case Ends in Legal 
Love Feast. 72 
The Legions case is an unmistakable testament to Houston's 
skill to persuade those who might be reluctant to render a favorable 
decision for a black defendant, particularly when represented by 
two black lawyers. 73 This is remarkable in light of the fact that 
even the allegation of rape alone would often lead even public 
officials to call for lynching. 74 
facts. Only the other day in a local case a Negro who murdered 
another with robbery as a motive, a charge that would have been as 
between white and white, or Negro and white victim, good for the 
electric chair, was disposed of by a jury with a 15 year sentence. The 
punishment as between Negro and Negro, as distinguished from 
white vs. white, or Negro vs. white victim, is decidedly different and 
clearly shows the racial approach to the question. In short the court-
room feeling is that the Negro is entirely inferior, with punishment 
for crimes by him against his own kind punished with less 
punishment than when the white man is involved. 
ARNOLD ROSE, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 180 n.8 (Beacon Press 1948). 
72. Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era 
Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 296 (2005) (citations omitted). 
73. One writer has suggested that there has been, "in interracial . . . sex crimes, a 
decided tendency toward a longer or more severe sentence where the victim was 
white .... " CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 368 
(The Lawbook Exch. 2000) (1940). 
74. Professor Kennedy states that: 
A constant refrain in countless speeches and editorials was that 
lynching constituted a brutal necessity to keep the Negro "beast" at 
bay. "Governor as 1 am," Ben Tillman of South Carolina confessed 
in 1892, "I would lead a mob to lynch the negro who ravishes a white 
woman." U.S. Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi commenled 
that often lynching was the only "immediate and proper and suitable 
punishment" for blacks who dishonored white womanhood. 
KENNEDY, supra note 45, a145-46 (citalions omitted). 
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B. Prosecution of Murder 
In 1947, Houston represented Weldon Jones, Jr., an eighteen 
year old resident of Maryland's Eastern Shore, in the murder of I. 
Rayner Graham.75 On January 12, 1945, Graham's dead body was 
found in front of his packing house on Deal's Island.75 The keys to 
the house were in one hand and one of his pockets had been pulled 
out. 77 His automobile lights were on and its motor was running. 78 
Footprints at the scene led to the home of Weldon Jones and his 
younger brother, Holbrook Jones.79 After searching the boys more 
thoroughly back at the station, the police found Graham's gasoline 
ration book in Weldon's possession.so 
After keeping the Jones brothers in custody for about 30 
minutes in the Salisbury police station, they decided to move them 
again, this time to the police station in Benson, Harford County, 
about 100 miles away.SI 
They arrived in Harford County at about 5:00 a.m. and were 
then "quizzed by Sergeant Paul J. Randall in the presence of two 
other police officers and a stenographer."s2 The sergeant said to 
Jones: "Your name has been mentioned in connection with the 
assault on two white women and the shooting of Mr. Rayner 
Graham."s3 Weldon Jones thereafter confessed.s4 
On appeal he challenged the voluntariness of his confession 
contending that the fear of mob violence motivated his inculpatory 
statements.85 Jones stressed that "after he was taken from his 
75. Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 266, 52 A.2d 484, 485 (1947). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Holbrook was later acquitted at trial. Brief for Appellant at 2, Jones, 188 Md. 
263, 52 A.2d 484 (No. 90). 
80. Jones, 188 Md. at 267, 52 A.2d at 486. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See id. Houston's brief presented a portion of the facts in this way: 
Weldon Jones, Jr. went to the sixth grade in school; he has lived 
all of his life around his home on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, and 
at the time of his arrest, was eighteen years of age. 
On the night of January 12, 1945, about 10:00 P.M., the dead 
body of 1. Raynor Graham of Deals Island, Maryland, was found in 
front of the packing house that he owned. Subsequent examination 
revealed a bullet in his body. The weapon from which the bullet was 
fired was never found; nor was the exact type of weapon ever 
determined. An expert on weapons from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation testified that the bullet could have been fired from any 
one of the following weapons: A Remington, Stevens, or Savage 
Rifle, as well as a Stevens single shot pistol or some foreign weapon 
2006] Criminal Justice Principles Of Charles Houston 325 
home at midnight, he was put in the automobile with the father of 
the girl he was suspected of having assaulted, and that he knew 
that mobs had lynched Negroes in the past when accused of having 
assaulted white women.,,86 He asserted that he was a frightened 
"country boy, who had gone only as far as the sixth grade in school 
.... ,,87 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals rejected Jones's claim 
that his confession was not voluntary and that the evidence was 
sufficient to establish premeditation for murder.88 
The Jones case reflects that Houston was concerned about the 
process of police interrogation. The overtones of possible mob 
violence and the police tactic of alleging unfounded instances of 
interracial sexual assault demonstrate the manner in which blacks 
were subject to unfair prosecution during Houston's time.89 The 
attempt to extract confessions in this manner was the very evil for 
which the Miranda v. Arizona9o 0ftinion, rendered in the middle 
1960's, was designed to address. I Houston's concern for the 
having similar rifling characteristics. Medical testimony was that 
death was almost instantaneous. 
The testimony revealed that earlier on that same day three other 
unusual events had occurred in the vicinity of Deals Island: (I) a 
white youth had been shot and slightly wounded by one of two Negro 
youths; (2) Ada White, a white woman, had been accosted by one of 
two Negro youths, and (3) Peggy Price, a young white girl, had been 
molested by a Negro boy whose hand she had bitten. These 
occurrences had taken place at Chance, Maryland, which is just 
across the bridge from Deals Island. The Jones brothers were 
suspected in each of these crimes. There was apprehension, 
excitement, and activity concerning these occurrences in the 
community. State police had been summoned and they, in tum, had 
thrown up a road blockade, summoned additional police, and had 
begun search for the Jones boys. Wood Jackson, the sheriff, had 
been looking for the boys. He had been to their home and advised 
their father of the things that they were suspected of and had sent a 
colored neighbor to their home to advise surrender. Neighbors had 
advised the family that a mob was out looking for the boys. 
Brieffor Appellant at 2-3, Jones, 188 Md. 263, 52 A.2d 484 (No. 90). 
86. Jones, 188 Md. at 268, 52 A.2d at 487. 
87. ld. 
88. ld. at 271, 272-73, 52 A.2d at 488, 489. 
89. See id., 188 Md. 263, 52 A.2d 484. 
90. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
91. Indeed, one observer wrote: 
[AlII the Miranda decision did was assure to the uninformed and the 
poor the same rights that reasonably knowledgeable and prosperous 
citizens had asserted all along. But bitter and persistent attacks-
originated in large measure by policemen and prosecutors who had 
failed to do their jobs properly in the first place, and then taken up by 
the right wing as a handy weapon to belabor the "Warren Court" with 
for a number of its decisions-finally convinced most conservatives 
and even many moderates that the Court had done something wildly 
radical. 
RICHARD HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER, AND FREEDOM IN 
AMERICA 235 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1970). 
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interpretation of the police evidence collection process in Jones is 
demonstrated in how he framed the confession issue before the 
Court.92 Although the appeal was unsuccessful his approach 
highlighted the issues which today constitute successful attacks on 
police interrogation.93 
One of the most interesting criminal cases handled by Houston 
was the murder prosecution by Eugene H. James in the Maryland 
courtS.94 Houston handled the case both at trial and on appeal.95 
Also noteworthy in this case were the other remarkable attorneys 
who participated in the trial. With Houston, as co-counsel, was an 
African-American attorney named William H. Murphy96 whose 
family owned and operated the Afro-American Newspaper. 97 The 
prosecutors in the case would also have outstanding legal careers. 
Anselm Sodaro, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City, would 
become known as one of the fathers of forensic prosecution.98 
92. Brief for Appellant at 2, Jones, 188 Md. 263, 52 A.2d 484 (No. 90). 
93. Miranda was not the first opinion to advance the concept that confessions were 
subject to constitutional scrutiny. In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme 
Court held that "[i]n criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a 
question arises whether a confession is incompetent because [it is] not voluntary, 
the issue is controlled by that portion of the fifth amendment ... commanding 
that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.'" Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (quoting U.S. 
CaNST. amend. V). However, the Court did not directly rely on Bram's holding 
in subsequent cases. In fact, in early 1951, the Court questioned its validity. See 
United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36,41 (1951). 
By the time the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states by the 
Warren Court in Malloy v. Hogan, the Supreme Court had once again expressly 
embraced the Bram rule and extended it two years later in Miranda. 378 U.S. I, 
6 (1964); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
The late Justice William O. Douglas wrote of the Fifth Amendment: 
Though torture was long used to solve crimes, experience proved 
that it was not an honorable way for government to deal with its 
citizens. . .. But the protection of the Fifth Amendment transcends 
the use of torture by the police. It outlaws all forms of physical, 
legal, or moral compulsion utilized to make a man convict himself. 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 145 (Doubleday & Co. 1958). 
He reminded us that "[t]hose who would attach a sinister meaning to the 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment have forgotten that history." ld. at 146. 
94. James v. State, 193 Md. 31, 65 A.2d 888 (1949). 
95. fd. at 33, 65 A.2d at 888. 
96. William H. Murphy, Sr. became one of the first African-American attorneys to 
open a law office in a downtown Baltimore office tower when the firm Brown, 
Allen, Watts, Murphy and Russell moved in at One Charles Center. Editorial, 
William H. Murphy, Sr., BALT. SUN, June 1,2003, at C4. [n [970 he was elected 
to the Baltimore City bench. ld. 
97. Thc Afro American Newspaper, About Us, http://www.afro.comlaboutus.htm 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
98. Anselm Sodaro became the Chief Prosecutor of Baltimore City shortly after the 
James case was decided in 1950 when J. Barnard Wells endorsed him as his 
successor. Obituary, Anselm Sodaro, 91. City's Chief Judge and State's 
Attorney, BALT. SUN, July 30, 2002, at B5. During his prosecutorial career, 
Sodaro won many cases that received national attention. !d. It is also noteworthy 
that he appointed the first African-American prosecutor in Baltimore history, 
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Alan Hamilton Murrell would later leave criminal prosecution for 
the defense bar. He would later become known as one of the 
greatest criminal lawyers of all time.99 Murrell would, in 1971, 
become the founding attorney for the Maryland Public Defenders 
office, one of the first state-wide public defender systems in the 
nation. 100 
The criminal case a~ainst James involved the July 6, 1948 
killing of Marsha Brill. 01 The eleven year-old was stabbed to 
death. 102 There was no evidence of attempted rape or that her 
killer had ever seen her before. 103 Two of the victim's friends who 
were riding their bicycles near where the crime occurred and from 
their testimony, the Court of Appeals recited the factual finding 
that a man appeared and "pointed a large knife at Marsha. The 
man followed and overtook Marsha, who was found lying on the 
ground, stabbed and crying beside the road."I04 James, the 
appellant, was seen by another witness at about noon with a large 
knife in his hand near the crime scene. 105 The 31 year-old 
appellant was examined by four psychiatrists and one psychologist 
in preparation for the tria1. 106 One psychiatrist, Dr. Lerner was of 
the opinion that appellant was "a mental defective belonging to a 
class of low-grade morons, and may be classified as a defective 
George H. Rosedom, in 1954. Jd. He was appointed to the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City in 1956 and served on the bench until 1980. Id. 
99. "Murrell, considered by many the greatest criminal defense lawyer in Maryland 
history, built [Maryland's Office of the Public Defender] brick by brick on his 
personal reputation." Op-Ed., Farewell to Stephen E. Harris, DAILY REC., May 
3, 2004, at I B. When his hand picked successor, Stephen E. Harris, was 
appointed Chief Public Defender in 1990, Murrell, then a 92 year-old University 
of Baltimore Law School graduate, had served nearly two decades. See id. 
Ironically, in the early 1960s, Harris had earlier in his career been hired by 
William H. Murphy, Sr. as the first white lawyer to work for an all-black law 
firm in Baltimore where Murphy was a partner. See supra note 96 (referring to 
the law firm Brown. Allen, Watts, Murphy, and Russell). 
100. Farewell to Stephen E. Harris, supra note 99, at 18. Upon his appointment by 
Governor Marvin Mandel in 1971, Murrell commented "[t]he person at the 
bottom is going to get what he is entitled to--competent representation." Rafael 
Alvarez, Alan Murrell, Lawyer for the Poor Dies, BALT. SUN, May 5, 1999, at 
B I. One former colleague of Murrell reported that he took the job reluctantly, but 
the Governor persuaded him by promising "it would be a meaningfallaw firm for 
the disadvantaged." Id. According to Murrell's colleague, the Governor felt that 
Murrell's appointment to the Office would provide it with "instant recognition 
and prestige." Id. Each of the lawyers who came into contact with Houston in 
the James case went on to outstanding professional accomplishment, perhaps by 
observing the high standard of legal skill set by Houston even in defeat. See infra 
note 125 and accompanying text. 
101. James v. State, 193 Md. 31,33,65 A.7.d 888, 888 (1949). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 33, 65 A.2d at 888-89. 
104. Jd. at 34, 65 A.2d at 889. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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delinquent.,,107 He was detennined to have a mental age of about a 
ten year-old and testing revealed "some schizoid characteristics 
and evidence of hostility towards the immature female.,,108 
Another doctor described James as "feebleminded with an 
estimated I.Q. 60 to 65 . . . .,,109 Some of the psychiatric 
evaluations suggested that the defendant was a pathological liar. 110 
On the day of the killing, the defendant was arrested at his 
house at 10:45 p.m. and taken by two police officers to the 
station. III He was questioned until about 1 :30 a.m. 112 He was put 
into a line-up the next day about 3 :30 p.m. and later taken by 
several detectives to a wooded section of town. I 13 They removed 
him from the cell several times that day.114 During one of his trips 
to the crime scene he confessed to the crime. I IS James provided 
1· . d ti . 116 po Ice a slgne con eSSlOn statement. 
107. Id. at 35, 65 A.2d at 889. 
108. ld. 
109. ld. 
liD. ld. 
III. Id. 
112. ld. at 36,65 A.2d at 890. 
113. ld. 
114. ld. 
115. ld. at 37, 65 A.2d at 890. 
116. ld. A portion of James's statement was recorded as follows: 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 
City of Baltimore 
Statement of Eugene H. James, colored, 3311 Paton Avenue, 
taken at 8:03 p.m. on July 8, 1948 in the Board room in Police 
Headquarters, Fourth floor. Interrogated by Inspector James H. Itzel, 
in the presence of Chief Inspector M. Joseph Wallace; Captain Oscar 
Lusby and Officers Thomas L. Roche and John D. Lowman of the 
Northern District, and later on in the presence of Mr. Anselm Sodaro 
and Mr. Allen Murrell oflhe Slate's Attorney's Office. 
Q. What is your name? 
A. Eugene H. James. 
Q. How old are you? 
A. Thirty-one. 
Q. Are you married or single? 
A. Single. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. 3311 Paton Avenue. 
Q. Who do you live there with? 
A. My mother. 
Q. And who else is in that house? 
A. Two sisters, Esther and Marie. 
Q. Are they married or single? 
A. All married. 
Q. Do they live there with their husbands? 
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A. Both away. 
Q. What kind of work do you do? 
A. Janitor. 
Q. Where do you work? 
A. At the apartment on Denmore Avenue. 
Q. Do you know the number? 
A. Forty-three or forty-six hundred block. 
Q. Do you know the name of the apartment? 
A. No, there was a name, but has been rubbed off. 
Q. What hours do you work? 
A. Three to six P.M. 
Q. What kind of work do you do? 
A. Bum up trash. 
Q. Is that all? 
A. That's all. 
Q. Do you clean windows or any general work at all? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you read and write? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What grade in school? 
A. Fifth grade. 
Q. Eugene, I am going to ask you some questions in regard 
to a crime that was committed on Glen Avenue last Tuesday, around 
noon time, (July 6th, 1948). Do you want to make a statement? 
A. ('II make it. 
Q. We want to understand eaeh other-we cannot make any 
promises to you, and anything you say here may be used against you 
in Court. Is that clear? 
they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you still want to talk to us about this? 
A. I'll still talk to you. 
Q. Nobody has threatened you up to now? 
A. No. 
Q. Mistreated you in any way? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. No promises of any kind have been made to you, have 
A. No sir. 
Q. Do you understand thoroughly what I am talking about? 
A. I understand. 
Q. On Tuesday, July 6th, 1948 at eleven o'clock, where 
were you, can you recall? 
A. (was down somewhere through Glen Avenue. 
Q. Eugene, what took you through that locality at eleven in 
the morning? 
A. Like I told you today, to see a man about a sign, but he 
was not home. 
329 
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Q. Explanation: He went to see a man with reference to 
painting a sign 'Dogs for Sale'. That was in the vicinity of Falls 
Road and Chestnut Ridge. 
Q. Did you talk with the lady of the house in reference to 
painting the sign? 
A. I talked to her, but she said he was not home. 
Q. On the way back, you found yourself again on Glen 
Avenue, is that right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Can you tell us where you met the boy with a bike first 
on Glen Avenue? 
me. 
A. I met him just as I showed you at that Road. 
(Had pointed out Glen Avenue, just above Mcrville.) 
Mr. Sodaro entered the room at 8: 15 P.M. (approximately). 
Q. Was it near the culvert we showed you? 
A. Down further. 
Q. Did you talk to the boy? 
A. No, I did not say anything. 
Q. He was riding a bike? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far away did you see the little girls from the boy? 
A. The girls, they was a good distance away. 
Q. How far? 
A. I would say a half a square. 
Q. Two girls together? 
A. One was catching up with him. 
Q. One was there alone where you were? 
A. She was not exactly where I was at. She caught up with 
Q. On her bike? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you walking on the open road, down Glen 
A venue, or did you go in the woods? 
A. I did not go in the woods at all. 
Q. You walked from where you saw the boy until you 
caught up with the little girl? 
A. She come past me. 
Q. What happened? 
A. This dizzy spell come down on me and I don't 
remember nothing. 
Q. You had a large knife with you? 
A. I had it in my belt. 
Q. When you took this knife out of your belt, did you grab 
it by the handle? 
A. I had it by three fingers (indicating position of three 
fingers, using a pencil to demonstrate). All I remember was doing 
that. (Indicating a jab to the left.) 
Q. With this pencil show us how you stabbed the girl. 
[Vol. 35 
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Jones's family sought to see him on the day in question but 
could not because the police told them that "nobody could see him 
but 'the lawyer. ",117 They later retained counsel.l 18 
A. (Showing a jab into the girl's stomach and indicating a 
left jab with the right hand holding the knifeD]. 
naval.) 
bare? 
her? 
Q. Where did you strike her? 
A. (Indicating spot below the breast plate and above the 
Q. How many times did you stab her? 
A. Once .... 
Q. Did she have on a little shirt with part of her stomach 
A. She had on a little middie blouse. 
Q. Was some of her body bare, do you recall? 
A. Some of it was bare, but I am not sure. 
Q. Do you recall whether she fell down? 
A. No, I don't recall. 
Q. After she fell down, did you run? 
A. No, I kept right on walking. 
Q. She did get up to run, we believe, and did you run after 
A. No, I did not even tum around to look. 
Q. And when you went, you went up to Berkley Avenue 
where you took us this afternoon? 
A. That's right. 
Q. That place where you threw the stick, did you throw the 
stick there where you showed us, and you kept the knife? 
A. That's right. 
Q. How long after that did you get home? 
A. I buried the knife first. 
Q. What way did you go to bury it? 
A. The same way, up the same street and over the next 
street, Oakford Avenue. 
Q. You were at Berkley and Oakford. How far is that from 
Key Avenue and Whitney? 
A. Not so far. 
Q. Did you walk to the place where you buried the knife. 
A. That's right. 
Appendix to Brief of Appellant at 1-5, James, 193 Md. 31, 65 A.2d 888 (No. 
137). 
117. James, 193 Md. at 37, 65 A.2d at 890. 
118. ld. Two commentators explain James's behavior this way: 
Most suspects quite naturally believed that refusing to talk or 
insisting upon the presence of an attorney would be a tacit admission 
of guilt. It follows that such behavior would only intensifY police 
suspicion and investigation. The best course, then, would be to 
deflect suspicion from oneself by appearing to be cooperative. So in 
order to avoid detection and punishment, some suspects take the risk 
of lying or telling less than the whole truth. 
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Houston argued that, although there was no evidence of 
physical coercion, the facts of how the police obtained the 
confession amounted to "psychological torture [that should render] 
the confession inadmissible.,,119 James also argued that the facts of 
the case suggest that the evidence was not sufficient to convict 
James of premeditated murder. 120 
The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. The 
Court determined that the confession was voluntary because 
defendant was not legally insane. 12l The Court opined that it 
would not "erect a medico-legal pseudo-science of [its] own to 
exclude this confession.,,122 The Court stated that to exclude a 
confession on the basis asserted by Houston "ha[d] no basis in 
.. I ,,123 eXIstmg aw. 
CHARLES A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 122 (1984). 
119. James, 193 Md. at 38,65 A.2d at 891. Houston's brief described some of the 
facts as follows: 
Eugene James was born in Baltimore, Maryland on April 25, 
1917 (App. P. 6). He attended parochial school at SI. Peter Claver's 
to the fourth grade. 
The Defendant was examined by Doctors Guttmaeher, Lerner, 
Cushing and Spear, as well as by Karl F. Sehoenrich, a psychologist 
(see App. P. 6). All agreed that the Defendant was and is in the 
borderline group of mental defectives and should be classified as a 
high grade moron. All of the examiners agreed that the Defendant, 
although 32 years old chronologically, has a mental age between 8 
years and 11 years. 
James has never had regular employment for any length of time, 
and was usually employed, if at all, as a handy man or janitor. 
On July 6, 1948, at approximately 12 noon, Marsha Brill was 
stabbed to death while walking west on Glenn Avenue, Baltimore, 
Maryland. She died shortly thereafter at the University Hospital, 
same day. 
At the time of her death Marsha Brill was in the company of 
Barbara and Allan Sapperstein, agcs 11 and 8 respectively. 
Defendant Eugene James was taken into custody by Officers 
Roche and Lowman about 10:45 P.M., July 6,1948, and was taken to 
the Northern District Police Station. 
The Defendant was questioned for several hours on the night of 
his arrest, and also for long intervals of time before the statement was 
finally taken at 8:45 P.M. on July 8,1948, somejiftyjive hours after 
he was taken into custody. . .. 
The uncontradicted testimony in this case shows that Eugene 
James was arrested on July 6, 1948, at about 10:45 P.M. Officers 
Lowman and Roche were the arresting officers who took him to the 
Northern Police Station where he was booked for investigation and 
was placed in a regular cell. This cell had only a two plank board as 
a bed, with an open toilet. ... 
Brief of Appellant at 2-3, James, 193 Md. 31,65 A.2d 888 (No. 137). 
120. James, 193 Md. at 45, 65 A.2d at 894. 
12l. fd. at 44-45, 65 A.2d at 894. 
122. fd. at 45, 65 A.2d at 894. 
123. fd. 
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As far as the sufficiency of the premeditation conviction, 
Houston's experts used the "Rorschach test" to show ps~chological 
features in an attempt to mitigate James's punishment. 24 Even in 
defeat, the advocacy of Houston was, in every way, exemplary. 
Indeed, the trial judge commented in ruling against James that 
"Mr. Houston, as good counsel as this Court has ever had try cases 
before it, grasped the importance and significance . . . one can 
gather from the four comers of all the testimony.,,125 This difficult 
case demonstrates Houston's interest in the prosecution of the 
mentally retarded, an issue that would later become relevant in the 
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence. 126 
Some of the same concerns addressed by Houston in the James 
case were examined in Fisher v. United States127 three years 
earlier. 128 In that case the defendant was charged with the murder 
of Catherine Reardon in the library building of the Cathedral of 
Saint Peter and Saint Paul in Washington, D.C. between 8:00 and 
9:00 a.m., March 1, 1944.129 Fisher was employed as a 
maintenance worker in the cathedral and was working at the time 
of the killing. 13o "The victim was the librarian. She had 
complained to the verger a few days before about [Fisher's] care of 
the premises.,,131 
Fisher testified that he killed Ms. Reardon "immediately 
following insulting words from her over his care of the 
premises.,,132 He explained "[a]fter slapping her impulsively," he 
struck her with a stick of firewood and then "choked her to 
silence.,,133 When Reardon began screaming later, Fisher "took 
out his knife and stuck her in the throat," and then dragged her 
body "into an adjoining pump pit, where it was found the next 
morning.,,134 The defendant provided a written confession in 
addition to his inculpatory testimony at trial.135 
124. Brief of Appellant at 9, James, 193 Md. 31, 65 A.2d 888 (No. 137). 
125. Brief of Appellant at 8-9, James, 193 Md. 31, 65 A.2d 888 (No. 137). 
126. See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) ("Construing and 
applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of 
decency,' we therefore conclude that [capital] punishment is excessive and that 
the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the 
life' of a menIally retarded offender."); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-25 
(1989) (holding that mental retardation may be used by juries as a mitigating 
factor in deciding whether to impose the death penalty). 
127. 328 U.S. 463 (1946). 
128. ld. at 465. 
129. ld. at 464, 465. 
130. See id. at 465. 
131. ld. 
132. [d. 
133. ld. 
134. ld. 
135. ld. at 466. 
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Houston presented evidence that suggested that because of 
Fisher's mental abnormalities "[t]here was evidence that petitioner 
was unable by reason of a deranged mental condition to resist the 
impulse to kill Miss Reardon.,,136 Despite Houston's efforts, 
Fisher lost the criminal trial and his conviction was affirmed by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 137 
In the Supreme Court Houston urged "that mental deficiency 
which does not show legal irresponsibility should be declared by 
this Court to be a reluctant factor in determining whether an 
accused is guilty of murder in the first or second degree .... ,,138 
The Supreme Court, while acknowledging that no doubt "there are 
more possible classifications of mentality than the sane and 
insane,,,139 rejected making what it called "a radical departure from 
common law concepts [which is] more properly a subject for the 
. fl' I . ,,140 exercise 0 egis abve power .... 
In a dissenting opinion, Houston's former Harvard professor, 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, observed that "[a] shocking crime puts 
law to its severest test.,,141 Recognizing that the trial may not have 
been entirely fair, Frankfurter said that an execution should not be 
authorized by society "without the most careful observance of its 
own safeguards against the misuse of capital punishment. ,,142 
Unlike the majority's veiled reference to "insulting words,,,143 
Frankfurter pointed out that Ms. Reardon was actually alleged to 
have called Fisher a "black nigger.,,144 After describing in greater 
detail Fisher's erratic behavior that day, Frankfurter concluded that 
the facts as presented at trial did not warrant a finding of 
premeditation. 145 He complained that the evidence of 
premeditation "was so tenuous that the jury ought not to have been 
left to founder and flounder within the dark emptiness of legal 
jargon." 146 
Rather, the jury should have been given clear guidance through 
proper jury instructions directing their attention to defendant's 
mental state defense. 147 The Justice suggested that men "ought not 
to go to their doom because this Court thinks that conflicting legal 
136. Jd. at 467. 
137. Fisher v. United States, 149 F.2d 28, 29, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1945). 
138. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 473 (1946). 
139. Jd. at 475. 
140. Jd. at 476. 
141. Id. at 477 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 465 (majority opinion). 
144. Id. at 480 (frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
145. ld. at 486. 
146. ld. at 487. 
147. /d. at 487-88. 
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conclusions of an abstract nature seemed to have been 'nicely 
balanced' by the Court of Appeals for the District ofColumbia.,,148 
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy wrote that "there 
are persons who, while not totally insane, possess such low mental 
powers as to be incapable of the deliberation and premeditation 
requisite to statutory first degree murder.,,149 Justice Murphy 
believed that the majority's conclusion required a jury to condemn 
persons of "low mental powers" to death "on the false premise that 
they possess the mental requirements of a first degree murderer or 
free them completely from criminal responsibility . . .. Common 
sense and logic recoil at such a rule .... ,,150 
Justice Rutledge, in a third dissent, observed that "a revolting 
crime ... requires unusual circumspection for its trial, so that 
dispassionate judgment may have sway over the inevitable 
tendency of the facts to introducc prejudice or passion into the 
judgment."ISI He believed an instruction that would have provided 
Fisher his mental state defense was warranted. 152 He explained 
"[ a] trial for a capital offense which falls short of that standard ... 
does not give [Fisher] his due.,,1 53 
Houston's strategy in the Fisher case was a remarkable prelude 
to the modem treatment of mental state defenses in the nation's 
criminal courts. I 54 The Supreme Court is still examining the same 
innovative issues Houston was attempting to establish in Fisher. 155 
There can be no doubt that the intricacies of the Fisher case will 
stand as the measure of the most critical mental state defense 
opinions for the foreseeable future. I 56 
V. PANEL OF THE JURY INCLUDES NO AFRICAN-
AMERICANS 
Key to Charles Houston's criminal justice decision making was 
the fact that during most of his career defendants were subject to 
criminal conviction by all-white juries. 157 He represented 
148. Id. at 489. 
149. Id. at 492 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
ISO. Jd. 
lSI. Jd. at 494 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
152. Jd. at 495. 
153. Jd. at 494. 
154. See David M. Siegel, Felix Franlifurter, Charles Hamilton Houston and the "N-
Word": A Case Study in the Evolution of Judicial Attitudes Toward Race, 7 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 317, 317 (1998). 
ISS. See, e.g., Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (plurality) (holding that 
states are empowered to legislatively exclude evidence of voluntary intoxication 
as a mental state defense). 
156. Siegel, supra note 154, at 317-18. 
157. "Although most northern blacks gained access to the regular court system by the 
middle of the nineteenth century, their testimony, when permitted against a white 
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defendants in the two key Supreme Court cases in an effort to 
correct that injustice. In Hollins v. Oklahoma, 158 Houston, along 
with his father, William Houston attacked the conviction of an 
Oklahoma man charged with rape in Okmulgee County. 159 
Because Negroes were excluded from jury pools in that county for 
a long period of time solely on account of their race, the Supreme 
Court reversed the defendant's death sentence on the grounds of 
discrimination. 160 
Three years later, in Hale v. Kentucky,161 Houston represented 
Joe Hale, a Negro who was convicted by an all-white jury in 
McCracken County, Kentucky.162 He claimed he was denied equal 
protection because the jury commissioners excluded all African-
Americans from the jury pool. 163 Both of these cases reflect the 
decades-long battle to convert jury selection practices in the United 
States. Prior to the Civil War, blacks rarely served on juries in 
America. 164 During Reconstruction, however, "juries invariably 
consisted of white and black Republicans, with blacks sometimes 
outnumbering whites. Southern Democrats interpreted the racial 
and political composition of federal juries as incontrovertible 
evidence of political persecution through judicial injustice.,,165 
As Reconstruction ended, so did the participation of African-
Americans in the nation's juries, particularly in the South.166 For 
example, in some southern counties "[n]o Negro had served on 
either a grand jury or a trial jury in 30 years," even though some of 
those counties had thousands of voting age African-Americans. 167 
person, was rendered virtually meaningless by all-white juries." Douglas L. 
Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition 
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. I, 7 
(1990). 
158. 295 U.S. 394 (1935) (per curiam). 
159. Id. at 395. 
160. Id. 
161. 303 U.S. 613 (1938) (per curiam). 
162. ld.at614. 
163. /d. Thc Hale case was tried in a county where "no Negro had served as a juror in 
more than fifty years .... [Yet] there were 8,000 Negroes in the county, of whom 
700 fully qualified under Kentucky law for jury service .... " KLUGER, supra 
note 6, at 204. 
164. See Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 370; 
KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 169 ("Prior to the Civil War, only one state, 
Massachusetts, permitted blacks to serve on juries."). 
165. Robert 1. Kaczorowski, Federal Enforcement of Civil Rights During the First 
Reconstnlction, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155, 172 (1995). 
166. See Albert w. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal 
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 887 (1994) ("Some Southern 
jurisdictions, however, kept African-Americans from jury service even during 
Reconstruction."). 
167. LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 232 (Pantheon Books 1966). 
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Closely connected to the problem of jury exclusion was the 
related practice of denying blacks the right to vote. Often, the 
panels were selected from the voting rolls of the county in 
question. 168 States often imposed poll taxes,169 "voter registration 
literacy tests,,,170 and other obstructions by Government officials to 
deny blacks political power. One Morgan County, Alabama jury 
commissioner even testified at one trial that "he had never met a 
Negro fit for jury dUty.,,171 
One of Houston's efforts to attack the problem was his 
participation in the Supreme Court case Nixon v. Condon. 172 In 
that case, Houston helped convince the Supreme Court to 
invalidate the Texas Democratic party's practice of excluding 
Negroes from their primary elections. 173 In an opinion authored by 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court explained "[ w ]hile that 
mandate was in force, the negro was shut out from a share in 
primary elections, not in obedience to the will of the party ... , but 
by the command of the state itself, speaking by the voice of its 
chosen representatives.,,174 Twelve years later, Thurgood 
Marshall, relying on Houston's precedent in Nixon v. Condon, 
successfully argued Smith v. Allwright175 where the Supreme Court 
finally did away with the "white primary.,,176 The Court again 
reiterated that the organic law of the United States grants to all 
citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials 
without restriction by any state because of race. This grant to the 
people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a state 
through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a 
private organization to practice racial discrimination in the 
election. 177 
This important foundation, which prohibited both 
discrimination from jury panels and suppression of the black voter 
rolls, helped lay the foundation for other important jury trial rights 
recognized by the Supreme Court several decades after Houston's 
death. 
168. See Judith Kelleher Schafer, "Under the Present Mode of Trial, Improper 
Verdicts are Very Often Given"; Criminal Procedure in the Trials of Slaves in 
Antebellum Louisiana, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 635, 641 (1996). 
169. See BENJAMIN QUARLES, TilE NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA 172 (1996). 
170. See DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE 
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 378 (William Morrow & Co. 
1986). 
171. GOODMAN, supra note 46, at 123. 
172. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
173. Id. at 81, 89. 
174. Jd. at 81. 
175. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
176. Jd. at 664. 
177. Jd. 
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When Batson v. Kentuckyl78 was decided it sent shock waves 
through the criminal justice community.179 The case held that the 
process of removing jurors through the use of "peremptory 
chalienges,,180 was not an unlimited right but that a defendant, 
under some circumstances, might be able to inquire about a pattern 
of challenges that appear to be based on race. 181 Although the 
standard for making such a challenge is still difficult to achieve, it 
was nothing compared to the "crippling burden of proof,182 
required to make a similar challenge under the doctrine of Swain v. 
Alabama. 183 This doctrine placed the obligation on the defendant 
to show racial discrimination when a prosecutor repeatedly struck 
. f h . 184 Jurors on account 0 t elr race. 
Houston's career-long emphasis on jury inclusion and election 
participation demonstrates that these were important values in his 
pursuit of criminal justice reform. 185 
VI. PURPOSE OF THE PROSECUTION LACKED 
ADEQUATE STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS 
Toward the end of his extraordinary legal career, Houston 
became heavily involved in matters related to the accusations that 
some Americans were involved in the activities of the Communist 
Party. 186 Such allegations against citizens were not a new 
178. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
179. See Jere W Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge is No Longer Peremptory: 
Batson's Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate invidiolls Discrimination from Jury 
Selection. 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 625,625-26 & n.6 (1994). 
180. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82. 
181. Jd. at 96 (holding that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination in selection of a petit jury" if the defendant shows that: "he is a 
member of a cognizable racial group" and that the prosecution challenged a 
member of the defendant's race, the peremptory challenges creates a jury capable 
of discrimination, and the prosecutor used the challenges to exclude jurors based 
on race). 
182. /d. at 92. 
183. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
184. /d. at 91, 92. 
185. See MCNEIL, supra note 2, at 133 (,,[Houston] advised and directed black lawyers 
throughout the nation about their local campaigns against discrimination in 
education, transportation, jury exclusion. and denial of the vote.") (emphasis 
added). 
186. University of Chicago historian Genna Rae McNeil notes: 
Charles Houston had an impressive record of support of the civil 
liberties of citizens who criticized the government of the United 
States. Houston and Abraham [sserman for the National Federation 
for Constitutional Liberties had filed in 1941 an amicus curiae brief 
urging that "in the interest of protecting democratic rights as 
guaranteed in the first, fourth and fifth amendments of the 
Constitution, the indictments against Albert Blumberg, Thomas 
O'Dea and Philip Frankeld, Communist Party officials charged with 
contempt of the Dies Committee, be dismissed. The concern in 
United States v. Albert Blumberg was "the protection of . . . 
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encounter for Houston. Since the early days of his legal career, the 
Communist Party's involvement with issues that concerned 
African-Americans had confronted Houston and affected his legal 
strategies. 187 Although he had never been a member of the 
Communist Party, Houston did represent a Communist attorney in 
a disbarment proceeding in Maryland. 188 His efforts, however, did 
not go without controversy. After an adverse ruling for his client, 
Houston was criticized for his legal strategy in that case. 189 He 
also was severely attacked by the Party when he sought a 
compromise for Crawford in the Virginia case where Houston's 
efforts had avoided a death penalty for his client. 190 
Through his work with attorneys at the National Lawyers 
Guild191 he became involved with the defense of several 
Hollywood screen writers who had come to the attention of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC).192 In 1947, 
the HUAC began to bring forward these screen writers and other 
citizens to ask them questions about their political associations. 193 
This endeavor was part of the HUAC's investigation of the alleged 
Communist infiltration of the motion picture industry.194 
John Howard Lawson and Dalton Trumbo were both tried and 
sentenced for refusing to answer questions of a congressional 
constitutional rights whenever and wherever thcy are properly 
asserted." The denial of constitutional liberties was the issue when 
Charles Houston, in 1943, volunteered his services to William 
Pickens and Mary McLeod Bethune in defense against Dies 
Committee's charges of subversive activities and worked particularly 
in Mrs. Bethune's behalf. . .. He insisted, "One should not have to 
denounce the Communist Party just to clear [oneself] of unfounded 
charges ... because we cannot deny that the Communists have done 
us great service." 
McNEIL, supra note 2, at 203 (citations omitted). 
187. The Communist Party's involvement in the Scottsboro case caught the attention 
of Charles Houston. MCNEIL, supra note 2, at 1 08. Houston once observed that: 
Communists are offering Negroes full and complete brotherhood 
without condition of race, creed or previous condition of servitude. 
They are the first to fire the masses with a sense of their raw potential 
power and the first to openly preach the doctrine of mass resistance 
and mass struggle. .. The Communists have made it impossible for 
any aspirant to Negro leadership to advocate anything less than full 
economic, social and political equality. 
WORMSER, supra note 63, at 198-99. 
188. In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467, 470 (D. Md. 1934). 
189. McNEIL, supra note 2, at 98. 
190. Id at 102. 
191. Houston was a member of the National Lawyers Guild during the I 940s and, in 
1949, succccded William H. Hastie, Jr. as Vice-President of the organization. Id. 
at 194. 
192. Id at 204. 
193. Martin H. Redish, HUAC, the Hollywood Ten, and the First Amendment Right of 
Non-Association, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1669, 1669-70 (2001). 
194. Id at 1678-83. 
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committee. 195 "Pursuant to two validly issued subpoenas, Lawson 
and Trumbo, both prominent writers in the motion picture industry, 
appeared before a subcommittee [of HUAC] .... Both testified 
under oath."l96 Trumbo refused to answer the question "whether 
or not he was or had ever been a member of the Communist 
Party." 197 He received an additional criminal charge for refusing 
to say "whether or not he was a member of the Screen Writers 
Guild." 198 Both men were convicted and their cases were 
consolidated for appeal. 199 
A brief filed by Houston, Martin Popper and several other Los 
Angeles attorneys participating pro hoc vice asserted that the 
"[a]ppellants strongly urge at the outset that they are protected 
under specified Amendments to the Constitution from bein~ 
compeIled to disclose their private beliefs and' associations .... ,,20 
Houston and the other attorneys asserted that "the Bill of Rights 
protects all individuals against being compelled to disclose their 
private beliefs and associations regardless of what those beliefs 
and associations may be, that the right of privacy of an individual 
is absolute, and that an individual may not be punished for 
remaining silent as to those beliefs and associations.,,201 
The appeals court rejected Houston's arguments, reasoning that 
"the right of free speech is not absolute but must yield to national 
interests justifiably thought to be of larger importance.,,202 The 
court explained that "[n]o one can doubt in these chaotic times that 
the destiny of all nations hangs in [sic] balance in the current 
ideological struggle between communistic-thinking and 
democratic-thinking peoples of the worJd.,,203 The court further 
concluded that since the motion picture industry plays a critical 
role "which may influence the minds of millions of American 
people . . " [I]t is absurd to argue, as these appellants do, that 
questions asked men who, by their authorship of the scripts, vitally 
influence the ultimate production of motion pictures" are not 
permitted to be questioned.204 Subsequent petitions to the United 
States Supreme Court filed by Houston were denied.205 Although 
this appeal was lost, the next ten years would see the end to the 
195. Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
196. Id. 
197. ld. at 50-51. 
198. Id. 
199. /d. at 51. 
200. !d. at 49, 51. 
201. Id. at 51. 
202. Jd. at 52, 
203. !d. at 53. 
204. ld. 
205. Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 
934 (1950), and reh 'g denied, 339 U.S. 972. 
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House Committee's heavy-handed inquiries.206 Houston's VISIOn 
and commitment to this issue and others related to free speech and 
association helped lay the foundation for the free exchange of ideas 
in America. Congress' wide ranging investigation into Communist 
activities aided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation has found 
its place among America's greatest examples of government 
invading the private lives of its citizens.207 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Charles Hamilton Houston is deserving of all the honors and 
accolades that he has received over the years,208 particularly in the 
area of civil rights, for which he is best known. His most famous 
student, and late Supreme Court Justice, Thurgood Marshall, 
commented that when it came to the strategy of Brown v. Board of 
Education,209 "[Charles Houston] was the engineer of all of it.,,210 
The bright glare of Brown and its importance in American 
history often eclipses the importance of Houston's other important 
contributions. This is particularly true in the area of criminal 
206. See CEDRIC BELFRAGE, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION 1945-1960, at I (First 
Thunder's Mouth Press 1989) (\973). 
207. See Seth F. Kramer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between 
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. I, 13-14 
(1991). 
208. Both Clemson and Harvard Universities have named research centers to honor 
Houston's accomplishments. The Charles H. Houston Center, 
http://www.clemson.edulhouston/quick_links/Charles_H_Houston.htm; Charles 
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race & Justice, 
http://www.law.harvard.edulprogramslhoustoninstitute/mission.html. Harvard 
and North Carolina Central law schools have designated faculty chairs in his 
name. See http: www.law.harvard.eduifaculty/directory/facdir.php?id=112 and 
http://www.nccu.edulpublicrelations/new/248.htm. Howard University has 
named its main law school building for Houston. Our Campus, 
http://www.howardlaw.orglindcx.php?id=288. The University of Baltimore 
School of Law awards an annual lifetime achievement award for litigation 
excellence in Houston's name. Press Release, Univ. of BaIt., Law School's 
Legacy of Excellence in Litigation Event March 12 (March I, 2005), available at 
http://www.ubalt.edu/glance/urJc\eascs/2005/3_1_05_lit.htm!. The first 
recipient of that award was William H. Murphy, Jr., the son of the lawyer who 
tried the James case with Houston in the 1940s. Jd. Present at the award 
ceremony was Charles Hamilton Houston, Jr., who is a member of the history 
department at Morgan State University, and M. Peter Moser, an attorney whose 
father had so richly complemented Houston's lawyering skill four decades earlier 
when he was the presiding judge in the James case. 
209. 341 U.S. 483 (1954). 
210. Thurgood Marshall, College Honors Charles Houston '15, AMHERST MAGAZINE 
(1978). reprinted in THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, 
ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 272, 272 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 
2001). Marshall was appointed to the NAACP's top legal job in 1938 upon the 
recommendation of his former law professor and mentor, the great Charles 
Hamilton Houston. CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS 81 
(Little, Brown & Co. 1993). Marshall was paid an annual salary 0[$8,500. ld at 
83. 
342 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 35 
justice where Houston accomplished many important benchmarks. 
Although many of his cases in the area of criminal procedure 
generated mixed results, viewed as a collection, those cases 
represent a body of important and visionary work in American law. 
Several of the principles that he established through successful 
litigation still have a permanent impact. His ground-breaking work 
injury selection from the 1930s laid the foundation for the "Batson 
doctrine,,,211 which now controls not only the criminal justice 
system, but also the civil litigation landscape.212 His detailed 
record building from voter lists and tax records, along with 
demonstrations of how these sources could be used to discriminate 
has led to modem jury selection reform. His work has resulted in 
the use of motor vehicle registration lists to make jury pools more 
inclusive.213 His emphasis on the fairness of an inclusive jury over 
seventy years ago still provides the strategy for establishing that 
right today. 
Houston's early work on capital punishment with the NAACP 
demonstrates an insight into unfair punishment which still guides 
the contemporary capital punishment debate. Concepts like the 
arbitrariness214 of the punishment and the absence of guided 
discretion215 are a direct result of the impact of cases like 
Crawjorct 16 where very serious allegations subjected a black 
defendant to a harsh criminal justice system with little tolerance or 
mercy. His concern for fair trials and his disdain for violence 
visited against blacks by lynch mobs while they were awaiting trial 
made his work on difficult murder and rape cases a career-long 
. 217 purSUIt. 
In James, Houston used the latest procedures from psychiatry in 
order to demonstrate that a "feeble minded" 10w-l.Q. defendant 
211. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (forbidding prosecutors from 
challenging "potential jurors solely on account of their race .... "). Prior to 
Batson, blacks were challenged and removed from juries in some jurisdictions at 
an alanningly high rate. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th 
Cir. 1975) (discussing that, in 15 criminal trials in 1974,81% of black jurors 
were struck in cases involving black defendants). 
212. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-19 (1991) (barring the 
use of peremptory challenges on the sole basis ofrace in civil cases). 
213. See. e.g. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3 (2000). 
214. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,293-95 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, 1., 
concurring). 
215. For two particularly insightful reviews of the problem of racial discrimination in 
capital punishment, see Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 
YALE L.l. 420, 439-43 (1988) (suggesting that jurors are influenced by the racc of 
both the victim and the defendant) and Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: 
Race. Capital Punishment. and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 
1395-98 (1988) (discussing historical disparities in punishment between whites 
and blacks). 
216. See Mack, supra note 72, at 296. 
217. Note that Crawford was early in his career and James was towards the end. 
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made an unreliable statement, which was coerced by the police?18 
In another Maryland case, Jones v. State, Houston tested the 
boundaries of what makes a confession voluntary. The 
circumstances of removing a defendant to a distant location and 
questioning him in a manner which suggested that officials would 
tum him over to a mob where the crime had occurred219 
demonstrates his concern for the integrity of police investigative 
practices. 
The eighteen-year-old Jones and his fourteen-year-old brother 
were handled in a manner inconsistent with the interrogation 
practices that are approved by courts today.220 Both the James and 
Jones cases raised concerns hauntingly familiar to those finally 
addressed by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, which 
now sets the standard for voluntary confessions throughout the 
nation.22I It is clear that by focusing attention on the practices of 
the local police in obtaining statements from the defendants, 
Houston was attempting to draw attention to the problem of 
intimidation of suspects by local authorities who desired to obtain 
confessions. Houston also emphasized the absence of legal 
counsel during the ordeals in each of these cases as a factor making 
the confessions questionable.222 It would be almost a quarter 
century later that the Supreme Court would adopt Houston's 
suggestion that counsel is critical in these circumstances. In 1963, 
the Supreme Court announced its opinion in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, which established the right to counsel for nearly all 
criminally accused.223 Later in the 1960's and 1970's the Court 
expanded those rights to the early stages of the criminal 
investigation process.224 
In his most controversial criminal case in the Supreme Court of 
the United States, Houston represented Julius Fisher who killed a 
librarian in the Washington Cathedral.225 Such shocking facts 
might have resulted in an uninspired criminal defense. Such was 
218. James v. State, 193 Md. 31,37-38,65 A.2d 888,890-91 (1949). 
219. Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263,268-70,52 A.2d 484, 486-87 (1947). 
220. For a recent Maryland case discussing the contours of police interrogation, see 
Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218, 230-36, 849 A.2d 410,416-20 (2004). 
221. 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966). 
222. See James, 193 Md. at 44,65 A.2d at 894; Jones, 188 Md. at 268, 52 A.2d at 
486. Furthermore, the alleged police abuses in Jones and James were similar to 
those complained about by blacks across the nation. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 
at 50 (1994) ("In 1939 and 1940 NAACP lawyers persuaded the Supreme Court 
to reverse three convictions on the ground that confessions had been coerced."). 
223. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
224. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309-13 (1973) (discussing the historical 
background and developments that led the Court to recognize that assistance of 
counsel is not limited to only the trial). 
225. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 465 (\946). 
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not the case for Houston. The complex psychiatric defense he 
developed at trial and advanced through each stage of the appeal 
was an innovation for its time.226 Houston convincingly argued 
that Fisher was suffering from a complex mental disorder that, 
although not rising to the level of insanity, still warranted a 
mitigating effect on his criminal responsibility.227 Where this type 
of defense is still controversial under the modem headings of 
"diminished capacity" or mental "syndrome" defenses, it has 
become the modem trend in many courts around the country.228 
Up until the last days of his life Houston engaged in extensive 
litigation for those considered at the time subversive and radical. 
In the case of Lawson v. United States, Houston mounted an attack 
on the power of Congress or any government entity to punish 
thought, speech, or political preference?29 His representation of 
those accused of being communists at such a critical stage in 
American history reflected his great insight into a true danger 
against American democracy: the suppression of dissent.23o 
Although he would die before the abuses of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee 
would reach its height, history must recognize that Houston's 
commitment to challenge their activities was also appropriate. His 
effort to remove from the criminal realm the punishment of 
association or political ideology was both correct andjustified.231 
In short, every criminal justice issue in which Houston invested 
time and energy and that resulted in a reported decision is now 
considered the "best practice" in the criminal justice system.232 
226. Siegel, supra note 154, at 332. 
227. Id. at 354. 
228. Id. at 354, 371; see also WAYNE R. LAfAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 451-59 (4th ed. 
2003); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal 
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REv. 99, 112-22 
(2000) (discussing the categories of "syndrome" evidence including Rape 
Trauma Syndrome, Battered Woman's Syndrome, and Child Sexual Abuse 
Accommodation Syndrome). 
229. 176 F.2d 49, 50-51 (1949); see also McNEIL, supra note 2, at 204-05. 
230. See United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 
851; In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934); see also McNEIL, supra note 2, at 
215. 
231. McNEIL, supra note 2, at 203-06,215; see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., 
THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM 189 (1949) ("The preservation of 
freedom requires a positive and continuing commitment. Specifically the 
maintenance ofthc United States as a free society confronts the American pcoplc 
with an immediate responsibility in two areas in particular: civil rights and civil 
liberties."). 
232. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946) (appealing a criminal 
conviction for murder on grounds of mental deficiencies that prevcnted the 
defendant's ability to deliberate murder); Hollins V. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 
(1935) (successfully challenging the exclusion of African-Americans from jury 
service based solely on their race); James v. State, 193 Md. 31, 65 A.2d 888 
(1949) (Houston introduced psychological factors to indicate that the defendant 
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Like his visionary work in Brown v. Board of Education, which he 
could not see to its completion because of his untimely death in 
April 1950, his criminal justice career reflects the same precision, 
diligence and reason that supported his Brown strategy.233 
Although his work in Brown will likely never be overshadowed, 
it is clear that his work in criminal justice deserves a place of 
honor as one of the great litigation careers of all time.234 All who 
care about a criminal justice system that is fair, accurate and 
operates under the "rule of law" owe Houston a considerable debt. 
lacked premeditation); lones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 52 A.2d 484 (1947) (Houston 
challenged issues surrounding voluntary confessions during police 
interrogations); Legions v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E.2d 764 (1943) (succeeding in 
overturning a black defendant's conviction for rape by demonstrating the lack of 
sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 
233. Thurgood Marshall summed it up precisely when he stated: 
You have a large number of people who have never heard of 
Charlie Houston. But you're going to hear about him, because he left 
us such important items . . When Brown against the Board of 
Education was being argued in the Supreme Court ... [t]here were 
some two dozen lawyers on the side of the Negroes fighting for their 
schools .... [O]fthose ... lawyers ... only two hadn't been touched 
by Charlie Houston. . .. [T]hat man was the engineer of all of it .... 
I can tell you this ... if you do it legally, Charlie Houston made it 
possible .... This is what I think ... Charlie Houston means to us. 
McNEIL, supra note 2, at 3. 
234. As the war ended, Charles Houston, whose health was failing, was pleased. The 
court was headed in the direction he had anticipated, the NAACP was growing in 
number, civil rights was now a national issue, and black voter registration was 
starting to climb. . .. Houston's strategy had transformed the legal culture 
within this country. WORMSER,supra note 63, at 163. 
